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POWER OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE
COMMISSION TO AWARD DAMAGES
The original Act to Regulate Commerce was enacted in 1887.
Its provisions upon the question of damages were crude and
manifestly incomplete. In Section 9, it is intimated that any
aggrieved patron of a railroad company may prosecute his claim
for damages before the Commission. By Section 14, it is made
the duty of the Commission to make a recommendation as to what
reparation should be made to an injured person. By Section 15,
it is provided that the Commission shall furnish to the offending
carrier a copy of its report, and a notice to pay whatever dam-
ages the Commission has awarded. By Section i6, it is provided
that if this order is not complied with, resort may be had, by
any interested party, to a federal court of equity for redress.
It was at once appreciated that such courts of equity were
without power to enforce an award of damages, since by the
seventh amendment to the Constitution 'of the United States,
jury trials are guaranteed in all common law actions involving
more than twenty dollars. And so it was, that the Commission,
as long as the act of 1887 remained unamended, declined to con-
sider any questions of damages, realizing that to do so would be
but to waste time in unfruitful investigations. But in 1889, Sec-
tion 16 of the original act was so amended as to provide for jury
trials in actions to recover damages awarded by the Commission,
and thereafter, the Commission felt it to be its duty to consider
requests for damages .as well as complaints calling for relief of
a quasi-legislative character.' Subsequent amendments to the
act have served to clarify the right of the Commission to award
damages and the procedure by which such damages can be col-
lected.
For a considerable time after the amendment of 1889, the
Commission seems to have entertained and decided demands for
reparation without having given any particular consideration to
the question of its jurisdiction. Thus, in one early case, dam-
ages were awarded by the Commission for discrimination in fur-
nishing cars to a shipper of hay, the basis of damages being loss
of profits on the commodity which he had sold, but was unable
I Macloon v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 3 I. C. C. 711.
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to ship.2 In another case, it was said that damages should be
awarded on the basis of the fall in the market where there had
been an improper refusal to deliver.3 In other and earlier cases,
damages were awarded for discrimination in furnishing cars, the
damages being measured by loss of profits on commodities which
should have been shipped but were not.-
The Commission, in its early days, however, was not always
consistent in considering damage claims. For it appears that
soon after its organization, it declined to entertain a complaint
based on an alleged failure of the carrier to furnish proper and
expedited service for perishable freight, saying that the shipper
must seek his remedies in the courts.' Nor did the Commission
assume to repair the mischief caused by goods being damaged in
transit ;6 nor would it at a somewhat later date go into the ques-
tion of damages for failing to make prompt delivery of fruit.'
In this last mentioned case, the Commission apparently for the
first time hints at the distinction between rate damages, so called,
over which the jurisdiction of the Commission was undoubted,
and general damages of the character there involved. But the
decision rests chiefly upon the ground that the commerce act
does not undertake to deal with or regulate such matters as the
receipt and delivery of freight. However, the cause of action
involved in this case, if any there was, arose in 1907, after the
passage of the Hepburn Act, by the provisions of which the
term "transportation" is made to' include all services in con-
nection with the receipt and delivery of property.
8 It may,
therefore, well be doubted if this conclusion of the Commission
rests upon a proper view of the scope and purpose of the act.
However, the Commission, a little later, was led to reconsider
the question of the limitations upon its power in the matter of
awarding damages, and in a very careful opinion, a majority of
the Commission held that its jurisdiction was limited to consider-
ing "rate damages," that is to say, damages that occurred from
the exaction of an unreasonable ratef In that case, the Coin-
2 II I. C. C. 61g.
S 12 1. C. C. 308.
'o I. C. C. 226; io I. C. C. 422.
54 I. C. C. 205.
"6 I. C. C. 85.
15 1. C. C. 53.
'C. R. I. & P. R. R. Co. v. Hardwick Elev. Co., 226 U. S. 423; C. C. C.
6' St. L. Ry. Co. v. Dettlebach, decided January ioth, 1916.
9 i I. C. C. 361.
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mission was asked to award damages because of the alleged fail-
ure and refusal of a carrier to deliver fruit at the proper receiving
station, resulting in injury to the fruit, storage and demurrage
charges, etc. The majority of the Commission held, three
members vigorously dissenting, that it was the function of the
Commission to pass only on questions which its expert knowledge
made it particularly qualified to handle, and since questions
involving general damages were ordinary court questions, the
Commission should leave them alone. It was recognized that
the Hepburn Act made delivery a part of transportation, but
applying the method of the Supreme Court in the Abilene Cotton
Oil Company case,10 it was thought that the general scheme of
the act restricted the Commission's authority to such damages as
could be awarded as appurtenant to an issue involving questions
of a technical nature committed by the act to the judgment and
discretion of the Commission.
In the next case involving this principle, the Commission was
disposed to go a step further in the matter of limiting its own
jurisdiction. It was necessary for it to pass upon the legality of
a rule for distributing coal cars in time of car shortage, and
upon investigation found that the rule was unlawful because
discriminatory. Thereupon arose the question of damages for
this discriminatory treatment. The majority of the Commission
felt that under the act it had no right to award such damages,
although resulting from a violation of that section of the act
prohibiting discrimination. The majority favored the view that
reparation could be awarded by the Commission only in such
cases as permitted an assessment of damages by the simple
mathematical process of subtracting from the rate paid, the rate
that should have been paid. If the ascertainment of damages
involved the necessity for considering such evidence as is usually
received and considered by the courts in cases of tort or for
breach of contract, the majority felt that such issues should go
to the courts. 1 But the Commission was constrained to retain
the question of damages and to consider it further because of a
certain decision of the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, in which it had been held that the Commission
alone could award damages resulting from the operation of a
discriminatory rule for car distribution.12 While this view of
10 2o4 U. S. 426.
'Hillsdale Coal & Coke Co. v. P. R. R. Co., 17 I. C. C. 356.
176 Fed. 748.
1
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the law has not been upheld, yet the Commission felt that some
possible injustice might result from its refusal to determine the
fact and amount of damages, and accordingly did enter an order
of reparation, based on loss of profits on coal not shipped and
the enhanced cost of that which was shipped.'2
It may be interesting here to note that the Circuit Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court upheld the Circuit Court of the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania in its conclusion that there
could be no suit at law, based on discrimination, until that dis-
crimination had been declared by the Commission, but found it
unnecessary to decide whether, after such discrimination had
been found, the aggrieved party is free to proceed in a suit at
law for his damages, or whether he must apply to the Commis-
sion alone for his relief.'
4
It would seem that this point has now been settled and in
favor of the view that one damaged by the exaction of an
unreasonable or discriminatory rate is not limited to the Com-
mission as the only forum in which he may seek relief. Of
course, the complainant, before he sues for damages in the
courts, must be fortified with an order of the Commission con-
demning the rate, rule or practice which he claims to have
injured him; but in the matter of damages, the Commission does
not furnish his only remedy. This would seem inevitably to
follow from the opinion of the Supreme Court in Phillips v.
Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co.'- For in that case, it was held
that a shipper might maintain his suit in the courts on account
of a rate found unreasonable by the Commission, even though
he was not a party to a proceeding whereby the rate was con-
demned. Such a plaintiff had, manifestly, never submitted his
claim for reparation to the Commission, and yet his right to sue
in the courts was clearly announced :-and this view was antici-
pated by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit.'(
The Supreme Court has also spoken upon another question,
which was formerly much in dispute, and which, as we have
seen, once divided the Commission. It now seems to be settled
that the Commission has authority to award reparation in any
case where it has jurisdiction to entertain a complaint as to the
validity of a particular rate, rule or practice. We have noted
1323 I. C. C. 186.
183 Fed. 929; 230 U. S. 304.
'236 U. S. 662.
18211 Fed. 65.
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the fact that in the Hillsdale Case,'" the Commission hesitated
to award damages resulting from the application of a car dis-
tribution rule, although the rule was condemned as discrimina-
tory. This hesitation grew out of the doubt in the mind of a
majority of the Commission as to its power to assess damages
except such as could be measured by a difference in rates. But
in a very recent case, this doubt has been dissipated by a holding
that whenever the Commission ascertains that any rate, rule or
practice is either unreasonable or discriminatory, it has the power
to assess damages.'
Other interesting questions remain undetermined by the court
of last resort. One of these presents the question of the power
of the Commission to act concurrently with the courts in award-
ing damages in instances not calling for the exercise of the Com-
mission's exclusive authority. An illustrative case will, perhaps,
best serve to present the question. A certain coal mine operator
sought to recover damages from a railroad on account of its
alleged failure to furnish coal cars. No question of discrimina-
tion in distribution was presented, nor did the complaint raise
the point as to the sufficiency of the railroad's coal car supply.
There was simply an allegation of demand, failure to furnish,
and damages. The majority of the Commission held that it had
jurisdiction to award damages, since the Hepburn Act made it
the duty of carriers to furnish transportation upon reasonable
request, and further defined "transportation" as including
cars. :9 The opinion of the majority rests upon the proposition
that its jurisdiction is exclusive. 20  The reasoning is that the
Hepburn Act requires carriers to furnish cars upon reasonable
request, and that whether the carrier has discharged its full duty
in this respect is an expert question calling for the exercise of
the judgment of the administrative tribunal which Congress has
created to solve such questions. But the majority opinion holds
that if mistaken in the view that it has exclusive jurisdiction, it
remains true that the Commission in such matters has jurisdic-
tion concurrent with the courts.
It would seem that two decisions of the Supreme Court have
well nigh destroyed the view that the Commission's jurisdiction
2,17 I. C. C. 356.
"Pennsylvaania R. R. Co. v. Clark Bros. Coal Mining Co., 238 U. S. 456.
"33 I. C. C. 52.
T. & P. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426; B. & 0.
R. R. Co. v. Pitcairn Coal Co., 215 U. S. 481; Robinson v. B. & 0. R. R.
Co., 222 U. S. 5o6; U. S. v. Pacific & Arctic Ry. & R. Co., 228 U. S. 87.
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is exclusive. For it has been held that a shipper who has been
denied his fair share of cars may sue in the state courts, and
recover damages where it appears that the case does not involve
any consideration of the reasonableness of the rule, but merely
a question as to whether the carrier has observed its own rule.
Such a case, we are told, involves no administrative question, and
the courts are therefore competent to decide it without the aid
of the Commission. And since Section 22 of the Hepburn Act
preserves all existing common lav and statutory remedies, it was
held that, the reasonableness of the rule not being involved, the
shipper might sue in a state court, without having previously
presented the question to the Commission.2 ' And so, following
this case, it was held that where a state statute merely declared
the common law as to the duty of a carrier to furnish cars, suit
might be maintained in a state court upon this state statute
for so failing, there being no question of discrimination. This
last case arose after the passage of the Hepburn Act, but the
court expressly holds that there is nothing in this act to oust
the jurisdiction of the courts in cases not calling for the exercise
of the Commission's administrative functions. 22
These cases seem to settle two questions: (Ist) That a suit
for failing to furnish cars, without other charge of misconduct,
presents no administrative question; and (2d) That the courts
may in the first instance be resorted to for recovery of damages
in such cases. The jurisdiction of the courts in such cases being
established, can it be said that the aggrieved party may resort at
his option either to the courts or to the Commission? Or, in
other words, does the Commission sit to repair every injury bot-
tomed upon a breach of duty, provided that duty is enjoined by
the Act to Regulate Commerce? It might, at first blush, seem
so, since Section 13 gives to every person the right to resort to
the Commission for redress, provided he is aggrieved by any act
of the carrier in contravention of the provisions of the act. But
it is reasonably clear that this language cannot be taken too liter-
ally. For the so-called Carmack Amendment, requiring every
carrier to issue a bill of lading and making the initial carrier
responsible for damages, is a part of the commerce act. Yet it
will hardly be argued that suit will lie before the Commission for
loss or damage to goods. The commerce act contains many
criminal provisions, but the enforcement of these is not commit-
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Puritan Coal Mining Co., 237 U. S. 121.
"Illinois Central R. Co. v. Mulberry Hill Coal Co., 238 U. S. 275.
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ted to the Commission. Mandamus will lie under Section 23 Of
the act in certain cases, but, of course, only the courts can grant
the writ.
And so it would seem that the broad language of Section 13
must be qualified by other portions of the act, and by consider-
ations growing out of the very nature of the Commission's
functions, as shown by a broad view of the act, considered com-
prehensively and in the light of its history and well understood
purposes. For if, as declared in the Abilene Cotton Oil Company
case, and others of the same tenor, the courts cannot act in any
matter which is within the scope of the Commission's administra-
tive powers, why should the Commission be considered as
empowered with jurisdiction not only over the matters which it
was created to handle, but over a class of controversies calling
for no exercise of administrative functions, and over which the
courts, indubitably, have jurisdiction if the plaintiff sees proper
to invoke it? It seems to the writer that it is the sounder view
and that it was the purpose of Congress to entrust to the Com-
mission only such matters affecting carriers as called for the
judgment of a body of experts, and that all other matters, being
outside of the scope of the Commission's peculiar field, should
be left for the courts. It is difficult to reconcile any other theory
with the principles that underlie the cases defining the power of
the Commission and the effect that must be given to its findings.
The Abilene doctrine (as it may be called for convenience in
expression) does not pretend to justify itself by a consideration
of the provisions of Section 9, interpreted according to the usual
meaning of plain and simple words. The construction of the
section is based upon a consideration of the whole scope of the
act, interpreted in the light of the great purpose it was enacted
to accomplish. It was considered that the Commission exists to
insure reasonable and non-discriminatory treatment in respect to
those complicated and technical matters with which only experts
can satisfactorily deal. To the end that this may be accom-
plished, and the aim of Congress be carried out, very consider-
able liberties were taken with those portions of Section 9 that
seemed to give individuals the option to resort either to the
Commission or the courts for recovery of damages. Of course,
all agree that the construction placed upon the act by the
Supreme Court is a most commendable piece of judicial legisla-
tion, since, had the conclusion been otherwise, the effect would
have been to defeat many of the beneficent ends which it was
enacted to accomplish.
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,A similarly broad view should be taken of the question which
we are considering here. It must be remembered that the
accepted doctrine, whereby the Commission's findings are conclu-
sive upon the courts,23 rests upon the view that it was the pur-
pose of the national legislature to create a body informed by
experience and competent to render expert opinion upon ques-
tions of preference and discrimination in the treatment of its
patrons by a common carrier. For this reason, doubtless, the
awards of the Commission are to be taken as prima facie correct
in suits to enforce them. Indeed, the Commission has the right
simply to find the ultimate fact of damage, and such finding,
without reference to underlying and evidential facts, must be
accepted by the courts, unless disproven, as sufficient to support
a judgment.24 Now, how can it be said that this presumption,
amounting in most cases to a conclusive presumption, can apply
to cases in which no expert questions are presented? What good
reason, consistent with the scheme of railway regulation, can be
advanced for making the findings of the Commission prima facie
correct, in a suit for failing to furnish cars, or for neglecting
promptly to deliver freight, or for negligence in handling ship-
ments? Quite obviously, it was not the purpose of Congress to
encroach upon the domain of the courts in this class of litigation.
The true view would seem to be that there are certain matters in
which the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction. In all such
matters, characterized by one court as quasi-legislative,2 5 the
Commission may, if the complainant so desires, give full relief by
awarding damages, if the thing complained of be found unlaw-
ful. But even in such cases, the complainant is free to sue for
damages in the federal courts after he has secured an order con-
demning the rate, rule or practice of which he complains, without
submitting the question of damages to the Commission. Like-
wise may any other person sue in the federal courts for damages
in the first instance if he can support his grievance with a specific
order of the Commission establishing the carrier's wrong. But
if it appears that the case for damages does not grow out of
some rate, rule or practice calling for the exercise of the Com-
mission's enlightened judgment, no good reason can be given, as




3235 U. S. 314; 215 U. S. 452; 220 U. S. 235.
24 238 U. S. 473.
25211 Fed. 65.
